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Introduction
Trademark protection and enforcement for Big Tech1 trademark owners
in the United States are akin to adhesive tape that holds a cardboard box
together to make it more resilient. A box is first assembled by positioning a
flat cardboard into a 3D rectangular shape, folding the bottom four flaps, and
subsequently adding adhesive tape to provide stability. The builder of the
box puts material into the box, encloses it by folding the top four flaps, and
then provides a layer of adhesive tape to ensure protection. Big Tech companies have built various “boxes” comprised of their different products and
services within their respective markets (i.e., social networking, online
search and search advertising, mobile operating system, and U.S. online retail).2 Moreover, Big Tech companies have selected the material or information allowed (o r prohibited) within each box,3 including, but not limited

1. For purposes of this paper, “Big Tech” focuses on tech giants such as Apple, Facebook,
and Google; see generally Omri Wallach, How Big Tech Makes Their Billions, VISUAL CAPITALIST
(July 6, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/how-big-tech-makes-their-billions-2020/; see
generally Michael Adams, The 10 Most Valuable Tech Companies in the World, U.S. NEWS (Feb.
11, 2022), https://money.usnews.com/investing/stock-market-news/slideshows/most-valuabletech-companies-in-the-world?slide=12 (listing Apple, Facebook, Alphabet (Google), and Amazon
among the topmost valuable tech companies in 2020); see generally Therese Wood, The World’s
Tech Giants, Ranked by Brand Value, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Aug. 4, 2020) (stating that “Tech
brands continue to prove their worth in the face of the pandemic”), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-worlds-tech-giants-ranked/.
2. Facebook has monopoly power in the market for social networking. Google has a monopoly in the markets for general online search and search advertising. Apple has significant and durable market power in the mobile operating system market. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION
IN DIGITAL MARKETS, Majority Staff Recommendations Subcommittee on Antitrust and Administrative Law of the Committee of the Judiciary, US House of Representatives (2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf.
3. Id.
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to “fake news,” misinformation, systemic biases, or viewpoints to benefit a
handful of profit driven enterprises.
Analogous to adhesive tape used to provide stability and protection for
the contents of each box, trademark law provides protection for Big Tech
brands and their cultivated goodwill among consumers. A trademark can be
any “word, name, symbol, or device” that is used by a person or entity to
“identify and distinguish his or her goods” as being the source of the product
or service.4 When consumers encounter a trademark affixed to a product (or
advertising for a service), the trademark allows the consumer to make a mental association between the product (or service) and the source.5 This allows
the consumer to ascertain the value or quality of a product prior to purchasing
it since the consumer can identify the source as the producer of that product.6
Thus, trademarks play an important economic role in helping consumers
identify unobservable features of a trademarked product (i.e., durability,
preference, taste, etc.) and incentivizing producers to maintain consistent
levels of quality over products or services.7
U.S. Trademark law provides Big Tech with legal tools to vigorously
protect their brands and goodwill. Big Tech takes advantage of these legal
tools through aggressive and intimidating pre-litigation and litigation tactics,
oftentimes, to the detriment of their competitors. Since trademarks can last
in perpetuity8 and relatively few constraints are imposed on trademark owners, Big Tech can vigorously enforce its trademarks against alleged infringers indefinitely. This allows Big Tech to provide an extra layer of everlasting
protection to Big Tech “boxes” of information within its relevant market.9
Thus, Big Tech uses trademarks as a weapon to create resilient “boxes” that
enclose society (i.e., the relevant consuming public within each market)
within, thereby creating an echo chamber where consumers are influenced
by a select few.

4. Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1949 § 45, as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051; 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
5. BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN-SOURCE CASEBOOK, 23-27 (Version 7,
2020), http://tmcasebook.org/.
6. For example, a consumer searching for a new laptop that encounters the Apple logo on
the back of a laptop will not only be able to ascertain that the laptop is made by Apple, but can also
make further inferences regarding quality, durability, and whether the consumer liked or disliked
the product in the past. See Id.
7. Id.
8. See generally William M. Borchard, A Trademark is Not a Copyright or a Patent, 2020,
https://www.cll.com/media/publication/335_Trademark-2020-web.pdf (stating trademarks last as
long as trademark owner continues to use mark in commerce, renews registration, does not abandon
mark, and mark does not become a generic mark).
9. The relevant markets for purposes of this paper include: the social networking market (for
Facebook), online search and search advertising market (for Google), or the mobile operating systems market (for Apple).
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This paper discusses how broad U.S. trademark laws adversely impact
competition and consumer perceptions relating to Big Tech brands and the
quality of goods or services provided. Part I focuses on anticompetitive techniques used by Big Tech to maintain market dominance and monopolization.
Part II introduces trademark law and focuses on how Big Tech uses it as a
tool to vigorously protect and enforce Big Tech trademarks from infringement by competitors. Part III discusses how Big Tech’s exploitation of trademark law helps Big Tech reinforce its durable market power at significant
costs for U.S. consumers.10 This paper is not a blueprint outlining how to
break up Big Tech market dominance, but rather, this paper seeks to highlight the significant issues that Big Tech market dominance poses within the
trademark realm. Thus, Part IV concludes by addressing potential remedies
available in trademark law that would make Big Tech more accountable, or
at least limit Big Tech’s power to engage in frivolous trademark litigation.
These remedies focus on preventing Big Tech from using trademark law as
a tool to maintain monopoly power; however, other remedies to control Big
Tech market dominance may include imposing interoperability requirements, imposing nondiscrimination requirements to prevent Big Tech from
self-preferencing or restoring antitrust law enforcement.11

I. Big Tech’s Gatekeeper Function Over Key Channels of
Distribution Strengthens Big Tech Market Dominance
Private companies, such as Google (or “Alphabet”),12 Apple Inc., and
Facebook (hereinafter, collectively “Big Tech”), are among the world’s ten
most valuable Tech companies13 with their revenues steadily rising despite
the COVID-19 pandemic.14 Big Tech has garnered significant market power

10. These consumer costs include increased data collection and inadequate privacy controls
by Big Tech; increased prices for products and services offered by Big Tech; and a substantial
deterioration in Big Tech’s quality of goods or services. See generally INVESTIGATION OF
COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 9, at n. 2.
11. Id. at 19-21.
12. In 2015, Google introduced Alphabet as Google’s parent company. See Conor Dougherty,
Google to Reorganize as Alphabet to Keep Its Lead as an Innovator, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/technology/google-alphabet-restructuring.html.
13. See Michael Adams, The 10 Most Valuable Tech Companies in the World, supra, note 1,
(listing market value for (1) Apple: $2 trillion, (2) Amazon: $1.6 trillion, (3) Alphabet: $1.05 trillion, and (4) Facebook: $760 billion), https://money.usnews.com/investing/stock-marketnews/slideshows/most-valuable-tech-companies-in-the-world?slide=12.
14. Therese Wood, The World’s Tech Giants, Ranked by Brand Value, VISUAL CAPITALIST
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-worlds-tech-giants-ranked/; see generally
Lawrence Delevingne, U.S. big tech dominates stock market after monster rally, leaving investors
on edge, REUTERS: TECH. NEWS (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-marketsfaangs-analysis/u-s-big-tech-dominates-stock-market-after-monster-rally-leaving-investors-onedge-idUSKBN25O0FV; see Shira Ovide, How Big Tech Giants Won the Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES,
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by strategically acquiring smaller or medium sized tech companies to gain
control over “key channels of distribution” in respective markets.15 Because
consumers rely on Big Tech online platforms and there is an absence of
widely available market alternatives, this gatekeeper function allows Big
Tech to exploit consumers by charging excessive prices, obtaining data from
consumers, or suddenly changing the platform’s policies.16
In 2021, the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) was estimated to be
$22.99 trillion.17 As of 2021, Google, Facebook and Apple had a combined
worth of at least $3.81 trillion, or almost 17% of the U.S. GDP.18 This
astounding figure points to the unprecedented market dominance and monopoly power held by the hands of so few. In 2020, the Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee of the Judiciary (hereinafter the “Subcommittee”), published an investigation of competition in digital markets.19 The Subcommittee investigated four online platforms—Apple, Google, Amazon, and Facebook—that “play an important
role in the U.S. economy and society as the underlying infrastructure for the
exchange of communications, information, and goods and services.”20 The
Subcommittee found substantial evidence of Big Tech monopolization that
carries significant costs for the economy and society as a whole.21 Although
the Subcommittee referenced Google’s use of trademark law to prohibit
trademarked terms from being used in Google ads,22 there is no indication
that trademark issues were the Subcommittee’s focus.
Thus, this paper uses the Subcommittee Investigation to explore how
Big Tech utilizes trademark law and legal strategies to ruthlessly exploit favorable market conditions and maintain market dominance.

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/30/technology/big-tech-pandemic.html (last updated Oct. 12,
2021).
15. See generally INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. For sake of a starker comparison, California’s GDP in 2019 was $3.14 trillion. See generally Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United States from 1990 to 2021, STATISTIA.COM (Feb.
2022), https://www.statista.com/statistics/188105/annual-gdp-of-the-united-states-since-1990/.
18. Id.
19. See generally INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 2.
20. Id. at 10; see id. at 9 ( “The purpose of the investigation was to: (1) document competition
problems in digital markets; (2) examine whether dominant firms are engaging in anticompetitive
conduct; and (3) assess whether existing antitrust laws, competition policies, and current enforcement levels are adequate to address these issues.”).
21. Id. at 10-11.
22. Id. at 202.
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A. Google Market Dominance: General Online Search Engine

In 1998, Google launched as a general online search engine23 and has
since become the “largest provider of digital advertising, a leading web
browser, a dominant mobile operating system, and a major provider of digital
mapping, email, cloud computing and voice assistance services.”24 Historically, Google has maintained market dominance by strategically acquiring
successful tech companies in competing fields.25 Google is currently the default search provider on 87% of desktop browsers and the majority of mobile
devices, thereby dominating the world online search engine market with 87%
of U.S. searches and over 92% of searches worldwide.26 By acquiring competing tech companies and establishing itself as the default search engine for
most devices, Google has successfully hindered free competition. According
to the Subcommittee findings, “[n]o new general search entrant over the last
decade has ever accounted for more than 1% of all U.S. searches in any given
year,” which provides sufficient evidence of Google’s durable monopoly
power. 27
Google’s monopoly power has led to consumer deception and an apparent decrease in quality of Google’s products and services, including Google
search results.28 For example, Google’s AdWords, originally launched in
2000 to allow advertisers to pay for “keyword-based ads” to appear alongside Google Search results, has become a tool that Google uses to undermine
competition and exploit its monopoly of general online search.29 AdWords
users’ bid for the privilege of paying Google an exorbitant amount of money
in the hopes that their content might be shown among the top searches in the
Google search engine. Over the years, Google has increased the number of
ads appearing along with organic search results and has displayed ads and
organic results in an inconsistent manner.30 These changes have allowed
Google to “extort businesses” to pay higher prices to be able to access

23. Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (Apr. 29, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm.
24. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 174 (noting
that Google products include Google Search, Google Maps, Google Play Store, Google Drive,
Chrome, Android, and YouTube, all of which have more than a billion users each).
25. Leena Rao, Google Spent Nearly $2 Billion on 79 Acquisitions in 2011, TECHCRUNCH
(Jan. 27, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/01/27/google-spent-nearly-2-billion-on-79-acquisitions-in-2011/.
26. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 176-77.
27. Id. at 181 (stating that “[t]hrough owning Android, the world’s dominant mobile operating
system, Google was able to ensure that Google Search remained dominant even as mobile replaced
desktop as the critical entry point to the Internet”).
28. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, Supra note 2, at 195.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Google users. Thus, Google AdWords is a prime example of one of
Google’s exploitive, money-generating techniques that allows Google to pit
users’ (in this case, AdWords users) against each other in an auction styled
apparatus.
B. Apple, Inc. Market Dominance: Mobile Operating Systems

Apple, Inc. was incorporated in 1977, and in August 2020, became the
first publicly traded U.S. company to be valued at $2 trillion.32 Apple is a
leading smartphone vendor in the U.S. that “designs, manufacturers, and
markets smartphones, personal computers, tablets, wearables, and accessories, and sells a variety of related services.”33 As one of two dominant mobile
systems available in the U.S., Apple’s iOS runs on more than half of the
smartphones and tablets in the U.S. and accounts for about 45% of the domestic market.34 Apple accounts for 20% of the global smartphone market
with 25% of smartphones worldwide running on iOS.35 Because Apple installs iOS on all Apple mobile devices and does not allow other mobile device manufacturers to license iOS, Apple controls software distributions on
iOS devices.36 Apple’s gatekeeper power over software distribution on iOS
devices allows Apple to maintain significant power in the market for mobile
operating systems and mobile app stores.37
Apple has acquired many software companies over the years to “create
a foundation from which it could launch new apps.”38 In 2014, Apple acquired Beats Electronics for $3 billion to launch its Apple Music in 2015.39
In 2018, Apple acquired Texture (a digital magazine subscription service)
which was incorporated into Apple New+ service40 and Shazam (music
recognition app) which was used as a supplement to Apple’s music

31. Id.
32. Id. at 330-331.
33. Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/000032019319000119/a10-k20199282019.htm.
34. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS supra, note 2, at 332.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 335 (stating that “[Apple] does not permit installation of alternative app stores on
iOS devices, nor does it permit apps to be sideloaded”).
37. Id. at 334.
38. Id.
39. Billy Steele, Apple’s $3 billion purchase of Beats has already paid off, ENDGADGET (May
28, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019-05-28-apple-beats-five-years-later.html.
40. Anita Balakrishnan, Apple buys Texture, a digital magazine subscription service, CNBC
(Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/12/apple-buys-texture-a-digital-magazine-subscription-service.html.
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services. In 2019, Apple acquired Intel’s smartphone modem business for
$1 billion,42 and in 2020, Apple acquired the Scout FM podcast app for an
undisclosed amount.43 Apple’s various acquisitions paved way for its monopoly power in the mobile app store market, which not only allows Apple
to control access to over 100 million iOS devices in the U.S. but also creates
barriers in competition by excluding rivals and preferencing its own options.44
C. Facebook Market Dominance: Social Networking

Facebook (now known as Meta) was founded in 2004 and has become
the largest social networking platform in the world.45 Facebook has acquired
“companies it view[s] as competitive threats” to maintain its social networking market dominance.46 The Facebook app alone has the “third highest
reach of all mobile apps, with 200.3 million users” in the U.S.47 Similarly,
the Facebook Messenger app has 183.6 million monthly active users (reaching 54.1% of smartphone users in the U.S.), and Instagram has 119.2 million
users (reaching 35.3% of smartphone users in the U.S).48 These products
control a significant share of users in the U.S., which in effect insulates Facebook from competitors entering the social networking market.49
Facebook discourages consumers from leaving Facebook social network sites by implementing high switching costs.50 These include (1) rebuilding the consumers “social graph,” which is comprised of photos, comments, posts, and other content; (2) losing access to their social graph and

41. Press release, APPLE, Apple acquires Shazam, offering more ways to discover and enjoy
music (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/09/apple-acquires-shazam-offering-more-ways-to-discover-and-enjoy-music/.
42. Press Release, APPLE, Apple to acquire the majority of Intel’s smartphone modem business (July 25, 2019), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/07/apple-to-acquire-the-majority-ofintels-smartphone-modem-business/.
43. Mark Gurman, Apple Buys Startup That Creates Radio-Like Stations for Podcasts,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-24/apple-buysstartup-that-creates-radio-like-stations-for-podcasts.
44. Id.
45. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 132 (noting
that Facebook’s five primary products in the social networking market include Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, WhatsApp, and Oculus).
46. Id. at 134.
47. Id. at 137.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 133-141 (stating that Facebook engages in competition within Facebook’s Family
products (i.e., Messenger, WhatsApp, Instagram) rather than engaging in “actual competition from
other firms in the market.”).
50. Id. at 144.
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data; and (3) learning how to use the competing social networking service.51
Thus, Facebook’s market dominance in the social networking market creates
high entry barriers for competitors entering the market and can “discourage
direct competition by other firms to offer new products and services.”52
Without competition, Facebook’s product quality has diminished resulting
in privacy concerns for its users and an increase in the spread of disinformation across the platform.53
Taken together, Google, Apple, and Facebook are dominant online platforms that have obtained monopoly power over their relevant markets. Despite consumer concerns relating to Big Tech monopoly power, consumers
remain loyal to Big Tech brands due to high switching costs.54 The foundations of trademark law help Big Tech continue to protect their brands and
goodwill among consumers.

II. U.S. Trademark Law Protects Big Tech Brands and Goodwill
Trademark law regulates brand names that populate the marketplace,
including Google, Apple, and Facebook.55 U.S. Trademark law provides protection to both registered and unregistered marks56 and was developed to (1)
incentivize producers to invest in quality; (2) reduce transaction costs, such
as consumer search costs, and (3) promote free competition in business and
trade.57 A trademark can be “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof […] used by a person […] to identify and distinguish his or
her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactures or sold by
others and indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”58
Thus, trademarks may include words (i.e. “Apple,” “Google,” or “Facebook”), phrases (i.e., Apple’s “Think Different” slogan or Google’s “The
Web is What You Make of It”), colors (i.e., UPS’s brown UPS trucks or TMobile’s use of the magenta color),59 sounds (i.e., “Google Dynamic Virtual
Surround” software for audio and surround sound), scents (i.e., “FLOWERY
51. Id. at 144-145. See also, Nicole Nguyen, If You Created A Spotify Account With Facebook,
It Is Forever Tied To Facebook, BUZZFEED (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/nicolenguyen/disconnect-facebook-account-from-spotify.
52. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 133.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id. at 384.
55. See BARTON BEEBE, supra note 5, at 11-12 (providing that “[t]rademark law protects the
goodwill of marks rather than creation of new marks, and stems from the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.”).
56. See Lanham Act §32, 15 U.S.C §1114; Lanham Act §43(a), 15 U.S.C. §1125(a).
57. See BEEBE, supra note 5, at 24-25.
58. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
59. Stacy Conradt, 9 Trademarked Colors, MENTAL FLOSS (May 17, 2017),
https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/27396/9-trademarked-colors.
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MUSK SCENT” in Verizon stores), textures (i.e., textures of wines), motions, building exteriors and interiors, product shapes (i.e., Apple’s assertion
over iPhone shape),61 or product packaging (i.e., Coca Cola’s bottle packaging).
Trademarks serve to lower consumer search costs and incentivize producers to produce “consistent levels of product quality” by allowing consumers to identify the source of the goods or services.62 When a consumer
sees a product with a trademark, the consumer is able to identify that the
product is made by a particular source, which enables the consumer to decide
whether he or she liked or disliked “other similarly marked items” in the
past.63 Trademarks are valuable because they allow businesses to cultivate
their brands and goodwill (or reputation relating to its products and/or services).64 For example, if a trademark owner provides an inconsistent level of
quality, consumers may be less incentivized to purchase the products, which
reduces the overall value of the trademark.65
A. Trademark rights and protections pursuant to the Lanham Act of
1946

Generally, to qualify for trademark protection under U.S. federal law,
the trademark must (1) be “distinctive” of the source of the goods or services
to which it is affixed, (2) must not be disqualified from protection by statutory bars, and (3) must be used in commerce.66 The Lanham Act of 1946
provides trademark owners with a basis to sue competitors for using similar
marks that cause consumer confusion with respect to the registered or unregistered mark.67
60. Nick Greene, The 10 Current Scent Trademarks Currently Recognized by the U.S. Patent
Office, MENTAL FLOSS (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/69760/10-scenttrademarks-currently-recognized-us-patent-office.
61. John DiGiacomo, Lessons in Trademarking Trade Dress: Apple vs. Samsung, REVISION
LEGAL (Dec. 27, 2017), https://revisionlegal.com/trademark/trademarks/lessons-trademarkingtrade-dress-apple-vs-samsung/.
62. See BEEBE, supra note 5, at 24-25 (A trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to
make higher quality products and to adhere to a consistent level of quality).
63. Id. at 24.
64. Id. at 25.
65. See BEEBE, supra note 5, at 24 (“The value of a trademark is in a sense a “hostage” of
consumers; if the seller disappoints the consumers, they respond by devaluing the trademark. The
existence of this hostage gives the seller another incentive to afford consumers the quality of goods
they prefer and expect.”).
66. Id. at 32.
67. See generally, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (likelihood of confusion with respect to registered
marks); §43(a), 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (likelihood of confusion with respect to registered or unregistered marks); § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (likelihood of dilution with respect to registered or unregistered marks); § 43(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (“cybersquatting” of registered or unregistered
marks).
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To successfully enforce a mark, the trademark owner must show that
the alleged infringer is using a similar or identical mark in a manner that is
“likely to produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the origin of
the goods or services in question.”68 There is currently no consensus among
the courts about how many factors are needed to trigger a likelihood of confusion.69 Furthermore, different circuit courts assess consumer confusion inconsistently, using various factors, and hold that no one factor is dispositive
in determining likelihood of consumer confusion.70 To determine whether
there is likelihood of confusion, the court must assess who the “relevant consuming public” is, which depends on whether confusion is either: (1) forward
(direct) confusion or (2) reverse confusion.71
1.

An Overview of Trademark Infringement: Forward Confusion

Forward confusion occurs when a trademark owner sues an alleged infringer for using the same or similar mark.72 The senior user (trademark
owner) is typically a larger company that has gained national recognition
through its marketing and advertising; whereas, the junior user (alleged infringer) is typically a smaller company that is using a similar mark that
causes consumers to believe that the “junior user’s goods or services are from
the same source as or are connected with the senior user’s goods or services.”73 Because the junior user is allegedly using and benefitting “from the
senior user’s more established goodwill”, the court will need to establish
68. Booking.com B.V. v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 915 F.3d 171, 187 (4th
Cir. 2019), cert. granted 140 S.Ct. 489; see also, AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that courts must balance the totality of circumstances to determine likelihood of confusion by assessing: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity
in the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and
the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the
mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines); see also TMEP § 1207.01 (providing
that Likelihood of Confusion occurs when the examining attorney concludes the applicant’s mark,
as used on or in connection with the specified goods or services, so resembles a registered mark as
to likely cause confusion).
69. See BEEBE, supra note 5, at 369; see generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (stating two main
types of confusion-based infringement include (a) signifier confusion, and (b) sponsorship or affiliation confusion.); see also Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC,
823 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2016) (providing that (a) signifier confusion occurs when consumer
fails to detect the difference between two different marks; thus, resulting in confusion as to the
source of the product or services; and (b) sponsorship or affiliation confusion occurs when consumer detects the difference between two marks, but concludes that due to the similarities, there
must be a commercial connection between the marks).
70. See BEEBE, supra note 5, at 369.
71. See BARTON BEEBE, supranote 5, at 391.
72. Molly S. Cusson, Reverse Confusion: Modifying the Polaroid Factors to Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 179 (1995).
73. Id. at 182.
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whether consumers of the junior user’s products and services would be confused as to the source of the goods and services.74 Thus, the proper “relevant
consuming public” is composed of potential buyers of the junior user’s (alleged infringer) goods or services.75
2.

An Overview of Trademark Infringement: Reverse Confusion

Reverse confusion occurs when a larger, more powerful, and nationally
recognized entity (junior user) adopts the existing mark of a smaller less
powerful user (senior user).76 In reverse confusion, consumers are likely to
mistake the senior user’s mark with that of the junior user; thus, the proper
“relevant consuming public” is composed of potential buyers of the senior
user’s goods or services. 77 Consumers are likely to be confused as to the
source of the senior user’s goods, and may come to believe that the senior
users products come from the junior user or that the senior user is actually
the infringer. 78 Reverse confusion is harmful because the senior user loses
value of its trademark, its product identity and corporate identity, which prevents the senior user from controlling its goodwill, reputation, and ability to
move into new markets.79
B. Big Tech Exploits Trademark Law to Maintain Monopoly Power

In recent years, Big Tech has engaged in anticompetitive practices that
prevent smaller tech companies from entering the market altogether.80 The
USPTO has stated in a recent study that a trademark “troll” or “bully” uses
its rights to “harass or intimidate other businesses beyond the scope of what
that law is reasonably interpreted to permit.”81 Big Tech has “bullied”
smaller tech companies by alleging intellectual property theft, blocking
74. Inna Kaminer, Set the Statutes Straight: Amending the Lanham Act to Dispel the Confusion Regarding Reverse Confusion, 36 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 71, 74 (2015), (“for example, a
Louis Vuitton knock-off emblazoned with “LV”: such a purse sold by a junior user will lead consumers to believe the product actually comes from the senior user, Louis Vuitton, because it bears
the “LV” symbol”); Leah L. Scholer, Righting the Wrong in Reverse Confusion, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
737, 737 (2004).
75. See BARTON BEEBE, supra note 5, at 391.
76. See sources cited supra note 74. See BARTON BEEBE, supra note 5, at 391.
77. See BARTON BEEBE, supra note 5, at 391; See also sources cited supra, note 72; See also
sources cited supra, note 74.
78. See sources cited supra note 74
79. Id.
80. Leah Nylen and Cristalano Lima, Big Tech’s ‘bully’ tactics stifle competition, smaller
rivals tell Congress, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/17/bigtech-competition-investigation-100701.
81. Gabriela Falcone, Trademark Trolls: A Warning to the Entrepreneur, B.C. LEGAL SERV.
LAB (Mar. 19, 2018), http://bclawlab.org/eicblog/2018/3/19/trademark-trolls-a-warning-to-the-entrepreneur.
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small tech companies from platforms, and essentially driving smaller tech
companies out of business.82
Big Tech trademark infringement suits demonstrate how Big Tech manage to prevail (or obtain settlements) in trademark cases simply because they
have more resources and money to file meritless or frivolous suits.83 Because
smaller and medium sized companies often have less resources and money
available to defend against trademark infringement claims (meritless or not),
these competitors are bullied by Big Tech to either (1) leave the market or
(2) pay Big Tech licensing fees to use their trademark. As competitors become disincentivized from entering the market, Big Tech is further insulated
from competition. This insulation emboldens Big Tech to raise its prices for
U.S. consumers while also decreasing the quality of the goods or services
provided. Thus, even though trademark law is supposed to incentivize consistent levels of quality for trademarked products and services, Big Tech’s
exploitative conduct of trademark law effectively allows the opposite to happen. This misleads consumers because they are left with the perception that
Big Tech goods (or services) are the highest quality, simply because Big
Tech has no other competition that produces products or services of similar
or higher quality.
Below is an examination of how Big Tech vigorously enforces their
trademark rights by filing confusion-based infringement claims against competitors to prevent new competitors from entering the market. Big Tech files
trademark infringement claims whether it is the first to use the mark in commerce; thus, both forward confusion and reverse confusion must be considered.
1.

Big Tech Trademark Infringement: Forward Confusion

Trademark law allows Big Tech to “vigorously enforce their rights” to
continue to cultivate “a substantial amount of goodwill.”84 Big Tech has
demonstrated a willingness to bully competitors from using marks that are
slightly similar to Big Tech marks by actively suing or threatening to sue
anyone that uses a singular component of their mark.85 These bully tactics
prevent competitors from using their desired mark in commerce and cultivating goodwill among consumers; thus, Big Tech prevents competitors

82. Id.
83. See Id. (providing that trademark infringement disputes can cost up to $25 million per
dispute, which allows Big Tech trademark owners to file trademark infringement claims against
any competitor that uses a similar mark, even if that mark is not likely to cause consumer confusion).
84. Michael Mireles, Trademark Trolls, A Problem in the US?, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 815, 824826 (2015), https://www.chapman.edu/law/_files/publications/clr-18-mireles.pdf.
85. Id. at 856.
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from being able to freely express their products or services through a desired
trademark. This prevents competitors from entering the market and allows
Big Tech to maintain and manipulate consumer perceptions relating to Big
Tech brand superiority and quality.
a.

Google: Forward Confusion Cases

Google dominates the general online search and search advertising market and owns many word marks.86 The Google word mark has been used
since 1977 for a variety of goods and services, including Google’s search
engine.87 Google actively engages in trademark enforcement to prevent competitors from using marks that are similar to or contain similar components
to registered Google trademarks. Such infringement claims are usually
based on grounds that an alleged infringer’s mark is likely to cause confusion
among Google consumers who may come to believe that either (1) Google
is the source of the trademarked goods and/or services; or (2) the trademarked goods are sponsored or affiliated by Google. Not all of Google’s
trademark infringement claims have been meritless, indeed some word
marks including “YOUTUTE,” “MUOOGLE,” and “ITUBER” have understandably been opposed by Google. These marks readily call to mind Google
trademarks. Thus, these marks are clear attempts of competitors trying to use
Google’s brand and goodwill for their products or services. However,
Google engages in trademark infringement even in cases where it is unlikely
that consumers would be confused by the competitors new mark. Oftentimes
the alleged competitor is forced to abandon its mark and either come up with
a new mark to describe its goods and services or leave the market altogether.
In 2020, Google filed an opposition to a new trademark, “FLOOGLE,”
used for “[p]roviding an on-line computer web site notifying healthcare personnel and other individuals of natural and manmade disasters or acts of terrorism and how to respond to such disasters or acts of terrorism.”88 Google
claimed that the mark would likely cause consumer confusion due to the
similarity between “FLOOGLE” and “GOOGLE” and the fact that both

86. GOOGLE BRAND RESOURCE CENTER, Google Trademarks list, https://about.google/brandresource-center/trademark-list/ (providing that Google trademarks include “AdWords,” “Android
Pay,” “Android,” “Blink,” “Chrome OS,” “Chromebase,” “DART,” “Gmail,” “Google,” “Google
Apps,” “Google Chat,” “Pixel,” “YouTube,” and many more).
87. Kirsten Errick, Google Opposes Floogle Mark For COVID-19 Website, L. ST. MEDIA
(Aug. 2020), https://lawstreetmedia.com/tech/google-opposes-floogle-mark-for-covid-19-website/. See also Google LLC v. Dennis, David B, 91264012, No. 1 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2020) (listing
the Google search engine as an “easy-to-use interface, advanced search technology, and a comprehensive array of search tools that allows Internet users to search for and find a wide variety of
online content in many different languages.”).
88. Errick, supra note 87.
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services are used in “connection with COVID-19 information websites.”89
Furthermore, Google claimed that the “FLOOGLE” mark would readily call
to mind Google’s trademarked search engine in the minds of the consumers
which would allow the competitor to benefit from Google’s goodwill.90
Although “FLOOGLE” does sound and look similar to “GOOGLE” it
is important to remember that to determine whether a likelihood of confusion
exists, the courts balance a variety of factors, none of which are dispositive.
Just because the marks may sound similar, there may be other factors that
would inhibit a consumer from being confused by use of the mark. Additionally, considering that “GOOGLE” is widely known, and likely qualifies as a
famous mark, it is questionable whether consumers would actually confuse
the “FLOOGLE” mark as originating from Google. Whether consumers
would be confused by the “FLOOGLE” mark is undetermined because after
Google filed opposition, Floogle failed to answer the Notice of Opposition
and the Notice of Default which resulted in termination of the trademark.91
Google has filed trademark opposition claims whenever a competitor
uses any Google trademark component, including certain words. In 2020,
Google filed opposition to the “BLUE PIXEL” trademark for use in connection with cameras (tripods, flashes, lens mount, etc.) because it would likely
cause confusion among consumers with Google’s “PIXEL” trademark.92
Similar “FLOOGLE,” the “BLUE PIXEL” mark was abandoned by its
owner in March 2021 after the company failed to respond to Google’s opposition claims.93 Whether these marks have actually caused consumer confusion is unclear, but it appears that Google has developed a strong trend toward filing opposition claims against any competitor that uses a singular
component (or word, such as “Pixel”) from its trademark. This has allowed
Google to vigorously protect its brand and effectively prevent competitors
from using any trademark that is similar to a Google trademark.
b. Apple: Forward Confusion Cases

Apple, which dominates the mobile operating system market, has engaged in various trademark infringement suits since its inception in 1978,

89. Id. (explaining that Google partnered with the U.S. government in March 2020 to develop
a website dedicated for COVID-19 information—including education, prevention, and local resources nationwide).
90. Errick, supra note 87. (In the case of Google LLC v. Dennis, David B, the T.T.A.B. noted
that the FLOOGLE mark “presumably is intended as a combination of the words “Flu” and
“Google” at a time of an international public health emergency.”).
91. Id.
92. Google Notice of Opposition to Pixel, ESTTA: ESTTA1075724, Aug. 18, 2020,
https://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91264279&pty=OPP&eno=1.
93. Id.
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and has continued to enforce its trademarks over the years. Apple owns
many word marks, several logos and phrases and slogans.95 To prevent competitors from using components of Apple’s trademarks, Apple has filed
trademark infringement suits against competitors that raise concerns regarding trademark bullying.96
In 2020, Apple (the senior user of the apple logo) filed an opposition to
the registration of Prepear’s (the junior user of the pear logo) mark for its
food prep app.97 Apple claimed that Prepear’s pear logo “readily calls to
mind” Apple’s widely recognized apple logo and thus would confuse consumers and cause dilution by blurring.98 To support its claims of infringement, Apple argued that its trademarks cover “identical and/or highly related
goods and services” compared to Prepear and that consumers would mistakenly believe Prepear is associated with Apple upon seeing the mark.99
Prepear (the junior user, smaller, less powerful company), owned by
Super Health Kids Inc., claimed that the two logos looked nothing alike and
that Apple was trying to bully the company from dropping the case and walking away.100 Unlike many small companies that do not have the resources to
fight against Big Tech, Prepear decided to fight
Apple on its opposition claims regarding the
pear logo mark. Although Prepear did not let
Apple completely bully them from the market,
Prepear did end up making concessions regarding its mark, such as changing the shape of the
leaf to have a flat side instead of being circular.101

94. Dan Kelly, What do iPhone, iPad, iCloud, and iBooks Have in Common?, DUETSBLOG
(June 17, 2011), https://www.duetsblog.com/2011/06/articles/trademarks/what-do-iphone-ipadicloud-and-ibooks-have-in-common/.
95. APPLE LEGAL, Apple Trademark List, https://www.apple.com/legal/intellectual-property/trademark/appletmlist.html (providing that Apple owns many word marks such as “Airdrop,”
“AirMac,” “AirPods,” Animoji,” “Apple Music,” “Apple Play,” “iChat,” “iPad,” “iPod,” “iTunes,”
and “iMovie;” Apple owns several logos such as the Airplay Logo, Apple Logo, Mac Logo, Podcast
Logo, and QuickTime Logo; and Apple owns phrases and slogans such as “There’s an app for that,”
“Think different,” and “Shop different”).
96. Kyle Jahner, It’s Apple vs. Startup in Faceoff Over Who Can Use Fruit Logos,
BLOOMBERG L. (Sep. 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/apple-said-to-thwart-otherfruit-logos-even-far-from-its-tree.
97. Apple Reaches Agreement With Prepear Over Logo, ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://acropreneur.com/apple-reaches-agreement-with-prepear-over-logo/.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Kyle Jahner, It’s Apple vs. Startup in Faceoff Over Who Can Use Fruit Logos,
BLOOMBERG L. (Sep. 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/apple-said-to-thwart-otherfruit-logos-even-far-from-its-tree.
101. See Various authors, supra notes 97-100.
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Figure 1: Apple claimed that Prepear’s logo would likely cause confusion among consumers due to the similarities between the two marks. The
left-most, green pear-shaped image, with a circular-shaped leaf is Prepear’s
original trademark design that Apple opposed. The right-most, black appleshaped image, with a circular-shaped leaf is Apple’s registered trademark.
Figure 2: The top image shows Prepear’s original (“OLD”) trademark
design that Apple claimed would cause consumer confusion. The bottom
image shows Prepear’s revised (“NEW”) trademark design, which consists
of a leaf with a flat side.
Prepear is not the only small company to be subjected to Apple’s trademark bullying.102 In January 2021, Apple filed an opposition to the registration of the mark “PODSHEDZ” claiming that the mark was confusingly similar in “appearance, sound, and commercial impression to Apple’s -POD
Family of Marks.”103 Apple claims that its senior use of “pod” is distinctive
and allows consumers to associate the mark with Apple and its “various audio and audio-related products.”104 Furthermore, Apple claimed that due to
the similarities between the marks, consumers are like to falsely believe that
there is a “connection, association, endorsement or other affiliation with Apple.”105 If Apple can successfully show likelihood of consumer confusion,
prevailing on the multi-factor likelihood of confusion factors, then it will
likely be able to prevent the registration of “PODSHEDZ” and likely prevent
future competitors from using any mark containing the word “POD.”
Apple’s intimidation tactics are a clear announcement to all potential competitors that Apple will not tolerate any competition in its market
space and will not hesitate to use trademark legal
tactics to accomplish its goals.
c.

Facebook: Forward Confusion Cases.

Facebook, which dominates the market for
online social networking services, has also bullied competitors using trademark tactics to protect its brand and goodwill. Facebook owns many trademarks for Apps, Platforms, and Social Networking products and services.106

102. Jahner, supra note 100 (noting that Apple has also opposed trademark registrations for (1)
Appleton Area School District in Wisconsin and (2) an autism charity).
103. Apple Inc. v. Pod Shedz LLC, 91266908, No. 1 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2021); See Kirsten Errick,
No Pod: Apple Opposes Pod Shedz Mark Over Use of “Pod”, L. ST. MEDIA (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://lawstreetmedia.com/tech/no-pod-apple-opposes-pod-shedz-mark-over-use-of-pod/.
104. See Apple Inc. v. Pod Shedz, supra at note 103.
105. Id.
106. Trademarks, FACEBOOK, https://en.facebookbrand.com/trademarks (providing that Facebook owns word marks such as “Facebook,” “Face,” “FB,” “Book,” “Messenger,” “Instagram,” “Gram,”
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In an effort to prevent competitors from using any component of Facebook trademarks, such as “face” or “book,” Facebook has vigorously engaged in aggressive
trademark infringement lawsuits throughout the years.
In 2010, Facebook filed a trademark infringement suit against a startup social
networking company, Teachbook, for using the word “book” in its name and domain name “Teachbook.com.”107 Facebook claimed that Teachbook was “rid[ing]
on the coattails of the fame and enormous goodwill of the Facebook trademark” and
has become “a blatant attempt to become Facebook ‘for teachers.’”108 Teachbook,
a startup comprised of two employees, offers an online community for teachers (less
than 30 users) and has not officially launched its website.109 To avoid costly litigation in a fight for the mark “Teachbook,” the startup company agreed to change its
mark to “TeachQuest” and as a result the “Teachbook” mark was abandoned.110
In 2015, Facebook sued Designbook, a startup social networking service, for its use of the mark “Designbook”111 Facebook claimed that since
Designbook uses the mark in connection with six services that are the “same,
related, or complementary to the goods and services offered” under Facebook trademarks, consumers are likely to believe there is “an affiliation or
connection between Applicant and Facebook where none exists.”112 Even
though none of Designbook’s branding is related to Facebook, Designbook’s
logo consists of different colors and fonts, and Designbook is not targeting
the Facebook community, Facebook opposed use of the word “book” in the

“Oculus Touch,” “Rift,” “Whats,” “WhatsApp,” as well as logo marks such as the Boomerang Logo from Instagram or the Messenger Logo from Facebook).
107. Courtney Rubin, Facebook Sues Start-up Teachbook Over Name, INC. (Aug. 26, 2010),
https://www.inc.com/news/articles/2010/08/facebook-sues-startup-for-trademark-infringement.html (citing other examples of Facebook bullying techniques, such as demanding a travel site
called Tracebook to change its name to Trip Trace).
108. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook sues start-up for using ‘book’ in name, CNN (Aug. 27,
2010), https://money.cnn.com/2010/08/26/technology/teachbook/index.htm.
109. See FACEBOOK, supra note 106.
110. Id. See generally, Facepets.com, LLC v. Facebook Inc., DOMAINNAMEWIRE, https://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/facepets.pdf; See also Facebook hit with “trademark bullying”
claim, TRADEMARKS & BRANDS ONLINE (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.trademarksandbrandsonline.com/news/facebook-hit-with-trademark-bullying-claim-3536 (providing that in 2014, Facebook bullied startup social networking company, for trademark infringement for using the mark
“Facepets” for its social networking site for pet owners); See TTABVUE. TRADEMARK TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD INQUIRY SYSTEM, OPPOSITION NUMBER: 91215074, USPTO (July 21, 2014),
https://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91215074&pty=OPP (providing that “Facepets” mark
was abandoned).
111. Christopher Lei, Facebook vs Designbook, MEDIUM.COM (June 3, 2015), https://medium.com/@vtaznboylei/facebook-vs-designbook-7da0dd87c08.
112. Justin F. McNaughton, United States: FACEBOOK VS. DESIGNBOOK: The Vermont
Trademark Wars, Part III, MONDAQ.COM (June 5, 2015), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/trademark/402622/facebook-vs-designbook-the-vermont-trademark-wars-part-iii-take-oursurvey-too-please-video-content.
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“Designbook” mark because of alleged “confusion in the industry.” In response to Facebook’s bully tactics against Designbook, the Governor of Vermont, Peter Shumlin, sent a letter to Facebook’s Cofounder and CEO, Mark
Zuckerberg, criticizing Facebook for bullying Designbook unnecessarily.114
Unfortunately, this made little to no difference for Designbook, which abandoned the “Designbook” trademark in 2016.115
These cases demonstrate how Facebook has managed to bully competitors out of their market, to protect Facebook’s brand. If a competitor’s mark
consists of “face” or “book” it is very likely Facebook will oppose registration of the mark by either sending cease and desist letters or filing trademark
infringement suits for confusion and dilution of a famous mark. Because
startup companies are unlikely to have the money and resources to dispute
trademark infringement claims, Facebook is empowered to enforce its trademarks, at any cost, to ensure that it monopolizes and capitalizes off its brand
recognition. Facebook’s trademark bullying tactics are nothing new and has
the effect of decreasing competition within the social networking market and
empowering Facebook with total market dominance.
2.

Big Tech Trademark Infringement: Reverse Confusion

Reverse confusion occurs when consumers are likely to be confused as
to the source of the senior user’s goods and may come to believe that the
senior users products come from the junior user or that the senior user is
infringing on the junior user’s mark.116 Most notably, Apple has successfully
taken over several junior user marks over the years that it was not the first to
use in the U.S., including the Apple (word and logo) mark, iCloud mark, and
iBook mark.117

113. Kyle Scott Clauss, Facebook Wants a Vermont Startup to Drop ‘Book’ from Its Name,
BOSTON MAG. (June 1, 2015), https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2015/06/01/facebookdesignbook-trademark-battle/.
114. Id. (providing that the letter stated: “I was very concerned to read about Facebook’s unnecessary bullying of a Vermont startup called Designbook. The Vermonters behind this company
are the type of people that make me proud to be this state’s Governor. They are young, entrepreneurial, and innovative. Given your background, I am sure you can relate. The last thing these
Vermonters deserve is for a giant corporation to threaten them unnecessarily. We don’t stand for
that type of injustice in Vermont. Just ask Chick-fil-A.”).
115. TTABVUE. TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD INQUIRY SYSTEM, OPPOSITION
NUMBER:
91225049,
USPTO
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91225049&pty=OPP.
116. See sources cited, supra notes 72-74.
117. Dan Kelly, What do iPhone, iPad, iCloud, and iBooks Have in Common?,
DUETSBLOG.COM (June 2011), https://www.duetsblog.com/2011/06/articles/trademarks/what-doiphone-ipad-icloud-and-ibooks-have-in-common/.
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The Apple word and logo was involved in trademark litigation from
1978, when Apple first registered its trademark, to 2007.118 Since Apple
Corps (the Beatles holding company) was the first to use the apple logo mark
in commerce in the U.S., it filed a trademark infringement suit against Apple
Inc. on the grounds that consumers would be confused as to the source of the
trademarked goods.119 Needless to say, in 1981 Apple Inc. paid Apple Corps
an undisclosed amount to be able to use its Apple logo on its goods.120 The
two companies decided to settle, again for an undisclosed amount, in 2007,
which has allowed Apple Inc. to continue using the Apple logo on its products and services.121
Similarly, Apple was not the first to use the iCloud mark in the U.S.122
The senior user, iCloud Communications, first used the iCloud mark in 2005
for computer telephony, email and video conferencing.123 In 2011, after Apple launched “iCloud,” iCloud Communications filed suit against Apple for
trademark infringement, unfair competition, and injury to business reputation.124 Even though iCloud Communications was the first to use the iCloud
mark in the U.S. and had already cultivated goodwill among its consumers,
the company decided to drop the suit against Apple and subsequently
changed the company name to Clear Communications.125
Another example is Apple’s use of the “iBooks” mark in connection
with electronic library and electronic books.126 The “iBooks” mark was first
used by the New York Publisher Byron Preiss in September 1999.127 Byron
Preiss published over 1,000 hardcover and paperback books under the
“iBooks” mark.128 In June 2011, after launching “iBooks” for electronic library and e-book delivery to electronic devices, Apple was sued for
118. Apple,
Beatles
Settle
Trademark
Lawsuit,
CNBC
(Feb.
2007),
https://www.cnbc.com/2007/02/06/apple-beatles-settle-trademark-lawsuit.html.
119. Id.
120. Id. Throughout the years, the two companies were involved in litigation over the use of
the Apple logo associated with Apple Inc. products, such as the iTunes Music Store.
121. Id.
122. Brad McCarty, Apple sued by iCloud Communications over iCloud trademark,
THENEXTWEB.COM (June 10, 2011), https://thenextweb.com/news/apple-sued-by-icloud-communications-over-icloud-trademark.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Jacqui Cheng, iCloud Communications changes name, drops suit against Apple, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 2011), https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2011/09/icloud-communications-ditchesits-own-domain-apple-trademark-suit/.
126. Josh Ong, Apple sued by publisher over iBooks trademark, APPLEINSIDER.COM (June 16,
2011), https://appleinsider.com/articles/11/06/16/apple_sued_by_publisher_over_ibooks_trademark.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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trademark infringement. The trademark infringement was filed on the
grounds that Apple’s use of the “iBooks” mark in connection with an electronic library accessible from iPad and iPhone was likely to overwhelm the
goodwill of the plaintiffs “iBooks” marks, rendering them worthless.130 In
2013, the trademark infringement case against Apple was dismissed the
plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence that their mark “is likely to suffer
from reverse confusion with Apple’s iBook mark.”131
These examples demonstrate Big Tech’s exploitation of trademark law
to not only protect their brands and goodwill, but also to bully competitors
from the market. These anticompetitive practices pose serious ramifications
to consumers.

III. Vigorous Enforcement of Big Tech Trademarks Has Lasting
Repercussions on U.S. Consumers
Big Tech’s exploitation of trademark law helps Big Tech reinforce its
durable monopoly powers at significant costs for U.S. consumers. Big
Tech’s anti-competitive practices have posed severe issues to the continuation of a free and open market. The lack of meaningful competition diminishes consumer choice and imposes significant costs to the consumer. Consumer costs include increased prices for products and services offered by Big
Tech; increased data collection combined with nonexistent privacy controls
by Big Tech; and a substantial deterioration in Big Tech’s quality of goods
or services.
A. Trademark Law allows Big Tech to increase prices & diminish
quality (and user experience) for trademarked goods and services

Online platforms’ dominance has left consumers with limited choice of
platforms, thereby creating opportunities for exploitive conduct by Big
Tech.132 Because market participants rely on Big Tech’s gatekeeper power
to access users and markets, concessions and demands have become ‘“the
cost of doing business’ given the lack of options.”133
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Steven Musil, Apple wins trademark lawsuit over use of ‘iBooks’ term, CNET.COM (May
9,
2013),
https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-wins-trademark-lawsuit-over-use-of-ibooksterm/#:~:text=A%20federal%20judge%20in%20New,of%20the%20term%20%22iBooks.%22&text=The%20lawsuit%20acknowledged%20that%20Apple,sold%20from%201999%20to%202006.
132. See generally INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 2. The
Subcommittee found evidence that dominant platforms oftentimes exploit their gatekeeper function
power to “dictate terms and extract concession that no one would reasonably consent to in a competitive market.”
133. Id. at 39.
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This issue has become more prevalent, especially in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic, where many businesses and consumers shifted “work,
commerce, and communications online” and held events through video chat
applications.134 Apple began to demand a 30% commission from businesses
that moved their events online, using Apple’s video chat app (which is also
a trademarked product) for virtual class offerings.135 Because Apple is the
trademark owner for all Apple video chat products—iChat, iMessage,
Facetime—Apple is incentivized to legally and strategically ensure that it
reaps a financial benefit from trademarked products. These exploitive practices have allowed Apple stock to rise from $56.09 per share on March 23,
2020, to $125.91 as of closing on May 11, 2021.136 Despite the questionable
moral ethics of price-gouging during a global pandemic, Apple has largely
escaped criticism for its methods. Apple has retained significant brand loyalty, in no small part, due to the goodwill garnered by its trademarks.137 Apple’s trademarks not only serve to prevent competitors from using a similar
mark, but in effect, also increase overall consumer costs, contrary to the intents of trademark law. Apple’s price increases have not been associated with
an increase in quality of products, but rather “an inferior user experience and
a reduction of innovation.”138
Google’s “AdWords,” also a registered trademark, is another manifestation of Big Tech monopoly power. AdWords is the only product that allows
businesses to pay for the chance for their ad to appear alongside Google
search results.139 The Subcommittee noted that even though Google claims
to recognize trademark law by prohibiting users from using trademark terms
in ads, Google “puts the onus of enforcement on victims” and does not stop
trademark infringers unless the trademark is owned by Google.140 Thus,
Google has created a circular economy where all its users contribute to the
ultimate monetization of a supposed “free” product. Although Google search
134. Id. at 10.
135. Id. at 349.
136. Apple Inc. Financial Report, GOOGLE FINANCE (accessed May 11, 2021),
https://www.google.com/finance/quote/AAPL:NASDAQ?sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi1iP2ElMPwAhXTpJ4KHXGqBhQ3ecFM
AB6BAgoEBo (Apple stock’s rise during the pandemic reflect the financial benefits of their monopoly power).
137. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra, note 2, at 355.
138. Id at 350. (finding that “Apple’s commissions and fees, combined with the lack of competitive alternatives to the App Store and IAP, harm competition and consumers” since it “leads to
higher prices for consumers.”).
139. Id. at 202. The chief technology officer and co-founder of Basecamp testified that “Google
uses this monopoly to extort businesses like ours to pay for the privilege that consumers who search
for our trademarked brand name can find us because if we don’t they will sell our brand name as
misdirection to our competitors.”
140. Id.
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engine does not invoke a cost per search, AdWords is able to monetize the
volume of searches by extorting businesses to pay for an opportunity to display their ads. Ultimately, all participants in this economy help direct money
towards Google.141
B. Big Tech trademarks and U.S. consumer privacy concerns

Consumers are subjected to a high degree of privacy invasion by Big
Tech, which allows for “persistent collection and misuse of consumer
data.”142 Because there are no other widely available online platforms accessible to consumers, Big Tech has the power to offer less privacy protection
than they otherwise would in a free and competitive market.143 This permits
Big Tech to lower the quality of services and goods by simultaneously monetizing and selling consumer data to third parties.144
Big Tech monopoly power harms U.S. democracy because consumers
do not know what type of data is being collected or how data is being stored
by Big Tech.145 For example, Facebook cements its market dominance by
not only vigorously enforcing its trademark rights against perceived competitors, but also by actively acquiring intellectual property rights of its significant competitors.146 By acquiring its competitors, Facebook is able to impose
high switching costs to its consumers, effectively retaining a vast majority
of its billions of users.147 Because Facebook products are used by their users
every day, Facebook is able to gather a significant amount of personal information about their users.148 Facebook monetizes this massive trove of information by selling its users’ information to third party advertisers, generally
selling the information to the highest bidder. This dramatically harms the
experience of Facebook’s users since the user is just as likely to see a sponsored ad as a post from their family or friend.

141. Because Google is the predominate search engine, Google is able to display as many ads
or as few ads as it likes, the only thing Google’s customers can hope for is that Google keeps its
promise to display ads alongside Google searches.
142. See generally INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS source cited, supra
note 2, at 18 (stating that Big Tech companies have an absence of “privacy guardrails” for consumers).
143. Id. at 53.
144. Id at 18. “As a result, consumers are forced to either use a service with poor privacy safeguards or forego the service altogether.”
145. Id.
146. Id. at 149-160.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 137-148 (providing that information collected includes an array of information about
consumers, such as the consumer’s location, residence, contact information, prospective love interests, prospective political interests, and even prospective economic interests).
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Despite this deteriorated service, Facebook users are still unlikely to
change providers because (1) there are no readily available alternatives, and
(2) the high switching cost imposed by Facebook oftentimes mean severing
ties with other applications, such as Spotify.149 Facebook’s dominance in the
social networking market is harmful to democracy because Facebook can
obstruct the flow of accurate information. A democracy depends not only on
free speech, but informed information. No opinion can be informed unless
the facts which substantiate that opinion are true. Facebook’s trademark
recognition misleads users into believing Facebook provides a superior product. Part of the consumer assumption is that the information found on Facebook is accurate. Unfortunately, much of the information which circulates
on Facebook is false or misleading in nature and contributes to false discourse of the state of the nation.150 Exploitive third parties ranging from
snake-oil salesmen to nefarious foreign governments such as China and Russia have attempted, with great success, to exploit Facebook’s lax content
control to influence the discourse of our democracy. By allowing third parties to influence the opinions of virtually all Americans, Facebook’s lax content control poses significant challenges to a free and open democracy as the
flow of false information undermines the population’s faith in their elected
officials and therefore, the democratic process.

IV. Potential Remedies Available in Trademark Law
One remedy to tackle Big Tech’s monopoly power includes breaking
up Big Tech and regulating Big Tech merger activity (and its trademarks) to
prevent unfair competition.151 Big Tech’s trademark dominance readily
brings to mind the power and influence held by oil barons and the various
monopolies of the early 1900s. Anti-trust laws were enacted to prevent the
dominance of the various monopolies that emerged in the U.S.152 Although
the problem is similar today, this solution probably is unrealistic due to the
different nature of the dominance held by Big Tech and the old oil barons.
Whereas the previous monopolies dominated in obviously distinctive
spheres, many Big Tech companies exist in the same plane but in slightly
different niches. Facebook, Google, Apple all share notable number of users,
yet their business model does not conflict with one another. Therefore, even
if these three companies are broken up, other companies will likely just take

149. Id. at 145. See generally Dave Morin, Announcing Facebook Connect, FACEBOOK (Mar.
9, 2008), https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2008/05/09/announcing-facebook-connect/.
150. Id. at 67.
151. Id. at 20, 378-382.
152. Id. at 391-92.
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their place because the space these companies occupy on the economic ladder is so undefined and subject to change.
An alternative remedy available in trademark law includes imposing
higher fees on Big Tech companies that engage in frivolous or meritless
trademark infringement claims. However, this is a difficult proposition because the likelihood of confusion multifactor test, discussed supra, is implemented differently by different circuits.153 Because no uniform standard has
emerged on how many factors are needed to trigger a likelihood of confusion, the only way that this solution can become realistic is if the Supreme
Court, or relevant authorities, implement a consistent confusion-based multifactor test to be used by all circuit courts. A uniform standard established
across all circuits, will likely discourage Big Tech companies from pursuing
trademark infringement suits based on meritless claims for likelihood of consumer confusion. A uniform standard would mean Big Tech companies who
rely on their jurisdictional advantages would no longer be able to hide behind
the shield of the law simply because they have more resources to file an infringement suit in a favorable jurisdiction. This should lead to less frivolous
and meritless infringement claims and encourage additional competitors to
enter the market.

Conclusion
The current market dominance by Big Tech makes the cost of market
entry prohibitive and chances of success slim.154 As Big Tech acquires more
technology companies, its market dominance is strengthened; thereby, making it more difficult for consumers to switch providers. High entry barriers
and high switching costs reinforce Big Tech brand loyalty.155 Big Tech strategies run contrary to the intent of U.S. trademark law (i.e., to promote quality
of goods and services by allowing customers to associate brands with quality). Big Tech has used trademark law to promote their monopoly power
while decreasing the quality of their services. This is a significant problem
in the Intellectual Property sphere today and requires immediate correction.
Because we are in unchartered historical waters, the solutions are not clear,
but what is clear is that unless an actionable solution emerges soon, Big Tech
market dominance will not stop, and their continued exploitation of

153. See sources cited, supra note 74.
154. See INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, supra note 2, at 47 (stating
that “[s]ome venture capitalists, for example, report that they avoid funding entrepreneurs and other
companies that compete directly with dominant firms in the digital economy”).
155. Id. at 341 (stating that “[u]sing its role as an operating system provider, Apple prohibits
alternatives to the App Store and charges fees and commissions for some categories of apps to
reach customers”).
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trademark law will only increase as they seek to further entrench themselves
into the lives of every American.

